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Books
ADRIAN J. DESMOND) THE APE'S RE
FLECTION (NEW YORK) THE DIAL PRESS/
JAMES WADE)) 1979.
This is not just another semi-popular dis
cussion of the linguistic abilities of pri
mates. Desmond is a specialist in the his
tory of evolutionary theory and a gifted
writer whose previous book, The Hot-Blood
ed Dinosaurs, succeeded in making palaeon
tolcgy not only intelligible but thrilling.
His concern with primate linguistic ability,
in the present book, grew out of his con
viction that "the problem had been formula
ted :'n nonDarwinian terms". Darwin demol
ished "the metaphysics behind The Great
Chain of Being", Desmond believes, but that
is widely ignored. Opponents of the idea
that nonhumans can handle language often
set up "language" as an honorific label
marking the last bastion of human moral pre
eminence.
Why should we care somuc~ whether apes have
"language"? Desmond thinks it undeniable
that they have symbols, ways of represent
ing ~he world to themselves; indeed, he goes
so far as to assert that "every creature has
an ijiosyncratic world view". What we ought
to be asking, he thinks, is what the world
is like to the ape mind. Ape partisans have
often been too concerned to I1humanize" the
ape. As a result, sign language I1has scar
cely been used to tap the apels social or
psychological reali
reality
ty l1. Rather, I1by fla
grantly crediting the gorilla with the en

tire gamut of human mental states ••• weef
fectively enslave the gorilla, robbing it
of psychic independence and reducing it to
human status".
Thus, both sides of the debate have set up
human language as a standard, and then ar
guea that nonhuman primates do, or donlt,
meet that standard. Desmond thinks that
we ought rather to be asking questions like
this: "Why do apes have this capacity for
wielding words when they have no natural
language? 11 We ought to be asking what
functions in ape mentality are preadapted
to symbol use. We ought to be treating
speech adaptively, rather than as a
l1 un
universal
iversal measuring rod". We ought to be
asking about the adaptive value of mental
experiences. Desmond has some interesting
suggestions about what good Darwinian an
swers, or partial answers, to sucli ques
tions might look like. The philosophical im-
portance of Desmond's book, however, lies not
in his specific answers but rather in his ar
gument that, to a considerable extent, we are
failing to ask Darwinian questions because we
are still thinking in terms of The Great Chain
of Being. As long as we think in terms of
ascent rather than adaptation, as long as
"Reason remains an Absolute", we will not
only misunderstand other animals, we will mis
understand ourselves.
Since Desmond refuses to "deny the chimpan
zee's sovereign existence by totally miscon
struing Darwinian nature", one expects him
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to have considerable sympathy with primates
who are the victims of human curiosity or
utility. He makes many remarks that do sug
suggest such sympathy, and, indeed, sometimes
writes with real moral sensitivity. Neverthe
Nevertheless, there remains a deep puzzles about his
moral attitude towards primates and other
animals. He begins his first chapter by quot
quoting psychologist Gordon Gallup's remark that
"someday, in order to be logically consis
consistent, man may have to seriously consider the
applicability of his political, ethical and
moral philosophy to chimpanzees". He returns
to this idea several times, suggesting at one
point that it defies "the very Darwinian
canons which promise truly to liberate the
ape from human value judgments". In his con
concluding paragraph he suggests that to extend
"the umbrella of our ethics" to the chimpan
chimpanzee would "deny the chimpanzee's sovereign
existence", as though humans were still to
be thought of as "the measure of Creation".
But what does it mean to extend "the um
umbrella of our ethics" to chimpanzees, or
other animals? There are two different in
interpretations of this, depending upon wheth
whether we are thinking of animals as moral agen~
(subject to blame, guilt, responsibility,
etc.) or as moral patients (subjects of moral
claims or rights, objects of moral obliga
obligations, etc.). That we cannot bring our mor
morality unproblematically to bear upon the ape
as agent, is surely correct. Much of what
Desmond says suggests that this is what he
means. We can certainly agree with his re
rejection of "'explaining' ape behavior by
human mores and values". But it does not
follow that "our" morality does not apply to
monkeys, and other animals, as patients. How
ought we to treat them? Can we mess them up
to satisfy our curiosity, or to please our
palate, or to prolong our life? Can't we ask
such questions? Can't we answer them?
Maybe not. Desmond's last chapter is enti
entitled, "The Mechanics of Morality". In it, he
retails a sociobiological account of the de
development of (human) morality. On Desmond's
view, inspired by Robert Trivers and Richard
Dawkins, "morality is an adaptive device to
keep reciprocating society stable for the
distinct benefit of each member". This un
unfortunately plunges us into all the philo
philosophical puzzles that have formed around
the disc~pl~ne of sociobiology during the

last half-decade. Evolutionary explana
explanations of altruism, etc., seem to threaten
to explain ethics away. "Accurately speak
speaking," says Desmond "nature is no more a
community of 'equals' than 'unequals'-
'unequals'-both are insupportable and meaningless
value judgments; in respect of disparate
creatures like Darwin's cuttlefish and
bee, or man and worm, it is a community
of incomparables." But this leaves us
wondering how we ought to treat these be
beings who are not higher nor lower nor
equal. Gallup wrote to Desmond that "it
is becoming increasingly apparent that
chimpanzees and people share basically the
same conceptual equipment in common. How
then do we justify keeping them behind
bars?" Desmond's response concludes: "I
am the first 'to uphold the chimpanzee's
sovereign 'self', but consider that I
would be insulting (if not untrue to Dar
Darwin) if I equated this with the 'self' of
another species." It is, no doubt, salu
salutary to emphasize the difference between
the chimpanzee's sovereign self and one's
own, but we still need to know whether
what we do to primates, and other animals,
can be justified. (And keeping them be
behind bars is the least of it!)
Desmond's difficulty in coming to grips
with the question of how we ought to treat
primates stems, I think, from deeper diffi
difficulties about how to fit evolution and
-ethics together, difficulties that Desmond
does not address in his book. Nevertheless,
The Ape's Reflexion is a very interesting
and very enjoyable book, one of the better
products of the "interminable debate over
the ape's possession of human language".
Edward Johnson
University of New Orleans

